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UNOCAL FIFTEEN YEARS LATER
(AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT)
BY RONALD J. GILSON"
ABSTRACT

The coincidence of the new millennium and thefifteenth anniversary
of the Delaware Supreme Court's announcement of a new approach to
takeover lawprovides an occasionto evaluatea remarkableexperiment in
corporate law - the Delaware Supreme Court's development of an
intermediate standardof review for appraisingdefensive tactics. This
assessment reveals that Unocal has developed into an unexplainedand
likely inexplicablepreference that control contests be resolved through
elections rather than through market transactions. In doing so, the
remarkablestrugglebetween the chancery courtand the supreme courtfor
Unocal's soul is canvassed. The author also maintains that the current
debate over shareholder-adoptedbylaws that repeal or amend directoradoptedpoison pills provides a vehicle to reposition Delaware takeover
law. Finally,the retrospective ends on a note ofpraise. Intertwinedwith
the development ofDelawaretakeover law is a reassessmentandimportant
expansion of the role of independentdirectorsin corporategovernance.
There is no reason why this importantimprovement cannot be preservedif
the DelawareSupreme Courtchooses otherwise to restore balance to the
law of takeovers.

A natural inclination towards stocktaking accompanies the new
millennium. It coincidences with the fifteenth anniversary of the Delaware
Supreme Coures announcement in UnocalCorp.v. Mesa PetroleumCo.1 of
a new approach to takeover law provides an appropriate occasion to step

*Charles J. Meyers Professor ofLawand Business, StanfordUniversity, and Marc and Eva
Stem Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University. An earlier version of this essay was
presented as the 1999 Pileggi Lecture at Widener University School of Law, and I have tried to
retain the tone of that format, albeit adorned with footnotes. Since delivering the Pileggi lecture, I
have had the benefit ofcollaboration with Alan Schwartz on a development ofthe views expressed

in more preliminary form in my lecture. As will be obvious to those who both attended the lecture
and read this article, the quality of the current effort plainly reflects Professor Schwartz's
participation. I am grateful to the Widener University School of Law and the Wilmington bar for
the hospitality I was offered during my visiL I am also grateful to Rob Daines, Jeffrey Gordon, and
Michael Klausner for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Win Hwangbo for excellent
research assistance.
1493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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back and evaluate a remarkable experiment in corporate law - the Delaware
Supreme Court's development of an intermediate standard for evaluating
defensive tactics.
This experiment began with, and was surely a response to, an earlier
and extremely controversial takeover wave. But these transactions were
remarkable for more than just their scope, goal, and method. They also were
remarkable as a social phenomenon, the studied indifference to which by
sociologists remains a remarkable disciplinary failure. The emergence of
junk bond financing - I prefer the period term "junk bond" to the more
dignified label of "high yield" because the difference in the terms capture
the distance in attitude that we've covered in the last fifteen years - opened
the market for corporate control to a range of acquirers who were hardly
members of the corporate establishment. During much of this period, I was
a reporter for the ALI Corporate Governance Project2 and had special
responsibility for the part ofthe project dealing with transactions in control.
As I sat in what seemed an endless series ofmeetings, only part ofthe debate
was about the right legal rules; the remainder, sotto voce, was over who the new raiders or the ALI members' clients - were going to control some
of the most significant actors in our economy.
Finally, and here we return to the realm of law from that of economics
and sociology, the Delaware courts ultimately placed themselves at the
center of the maelstrom. As de Touqeville noted about the United States
some 175 years ago, lawyers are at the core of our economic and political
life.3 In the 1980s the Delaware courts were squarely in the middle of the
largest and most contentious business transactions in history.
We now have sufficient perspective, both on that takeover wave and
on the Delaware courts' response, to reassess the motivation and the efficacy
of this effort at modernizing corporate law to cope with the emergence of
hostile tender offers, a phenomenon which then existing corporate law was
both technically and conceptually inadequate to address. While acknowledging the difficult circumstances in which the Delaware Supreme Court
found itself in 1985, 1 will argue that Unocalultimately has developed into
an unexplained and, I think, inexplicable preference that control contests be
resolved through elections rather than market transactions. In doing so, I
will highlight the remarkable struggle between the chancery court and the
supreme court for Unocals soul, a contest I will suggest the supreme court
won only by fiat. I will also maintain that the current debate over
AMERCAN LAW INSITuTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
3
IALEXISDETOUQuEv i.EDEmocRACYINAMERICA272-80(Bradleyed. 1987) ("Scarcely
any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into ajudicial
question.").
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shareholder-adopted bylaws that repeal or amend director-adopted poison
pill plans provides a vehicle to reposition Delaware takeover law for a new
millennium. In the end, takeovers are just an equilibrating mechanism that
is triggered by changes in the real economic environment.4 It is a
noncontroversial prediction that the pace of change will continue to
accelerate, and that transactional responses will continue to pressure
corporate law. Delaware's current pro-election, anti-market bias is not suited
to meet that challenge.
Finally, I will end my retrospective on a note of praise. Intertwined
with the development of Delaware takeover jurisprudence is a reassessment
and important expansion of the independent director's role in corporate
governance. There is no reason why this important development cannot be
preserved if the Delaware Supreme Court chooses to otherwise restore
balance to the law of takeovers.
A word about style before going forward with substance. The
audience to which this essay speaks needs no lengthy account of the last
fifteen years of Delaware case law. For the judiciary and corporate bar, the
takeover cases that stretch from 1985 to 2000 have dictated the path of their
professional lives; they need no detailed itinerary from me to recall the
journey. Thus, my argument is made at the edge, taking most of the trail for
granted and focusing only on junctions that I believe were especially
important.5
I. SETTING THE STAGE

Over the last fifteen years the Delaware courts have been at the center
of a process that was far larger than the law. Starting in the 1970s and
accelerating through the 1980s, the United States has undergone one of the
most remarkable industrial restructurings in our history. The organizational
calm of the early 1970s was shattered by an unprecedented wave of hostile
takeovers whose goal was quite explicit: to reshape the structure of
American industry. Powered by an increase in pension fund assets and an
increased capacity of the capital markets to fund control transactions, 6

'For discussion of the equilibrating function of takeovers, see Ronald J. Gilson, The
PoliticalEcology of Takeovers: Thoughts on HarmonizingThe European CorporateGovernance
Environment, 61 FORD. L. REv. 161, 164-65 (1992).
'For those who are interested in a more detailed description, see RONALD J. GILSON &
BERNARD BLACK, Tim LAW AND FINANcE OF CORPORATE ACQUISmONS 801-95 (2d ed. 1995);

RONALD J. GuSON& BERNARD BLACK, TAE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISmONS 7297 (Supp. 1999).
.'Bengt Holstrom & Steven Kaplan, CorporateGovernance,and MergerActivity in the
UnitedStates: MakingSense ofthe 1980s and 1990s, 15 J.LCON.PmsPEc. 121 (2001) (providing
an overview of the debate concerning the motivations of takeover activity).
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takeovers enforced a new level of financial and operational discipline. Some
transactions drove an industrial movement back to focus - a strategy based
on specialization in industries whose demands fit a company's experience
and skills7 - by dissipating the excess cash flow that oil companies and
others were diverting to a bizarre range of diversification and unprofitable
expansion,' and by breaking up 1960's conglomerates.9 Others eliminated
excess capacity by holding up all activities to the cost of the capital
committed to them.
At the time, however, the industrial logic of the new takeover
phenomenon was less clear. The combination of the rate of change and the
vehicle of change - hostile takeovers launched by a new class of
entrepreneurs who had no access to the business arena in which their targets
contended until the application ofjunk bond financing to acquisitions generated an extreme reaction. Many prominent commentators, some like Martin Lipton"- with a stake in resisting the takeover movement, and
others -

like Peter Drucker"

-

without an ax to grind, thought junk bond

financed, bust-up takeovers a threat to the very Republic. The chairman of
Deutsche Bank was rather more direct. In a hyperbole the extent of whose
overstatement has been made clear by recent events in Russia, characterized
the takeover wave simply as "gangster capitalism."
The Delaware courts had little choice but to intercede in this
controversy. Only three institutions were in a position to act effectively in
response to this good faith but overheated debate, but two were unlikely
candidates. Congress seemed to have exhausted its energy a decade before
with the Williams Act. And the Securities Exchange Commission
increasingly voiced a decidedly pro-takeover position. 2 If there was to be
a balanced assessment, which given the shrillness of the debate must have
seemed attractive if only for its softer tone, it would have had to come from
Delaware.

'Robert Comment & Gregg Jarrell,
CorporateFocus,Stock Returns andthe Marketfor
CorporateControl,37 J. FIN. ECON. 67 (1995).
'See, e.g., Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGErS

314, 329-37 (J. Coffee et al.
eds., 1988).

'See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate
Specialization,in BROOKINGSPAPERsONECONoMICAcnvrrY, MIcROcONOMIcs 1(1990); Andrei
Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the 1980s, 249 Sct. 745 (1990).
'°Martin Lipton, TakeoverBids in the Target'sBoardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979).
'Peter F. Drucker, Taming the CorporateTakeover,WALL ST. J., Oct. 30,1984, at 30, col.
3 ("[A] good many experienced business leaders I know hold takeover fear to be a main cause of
the decline in America's competitive strength in the world economy... [i]t contributes to the

obsession with the short term.").
' 2For example, the SEC filed an amicus brief in Moran v. HouseholdInt'l Inc., 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985), asserting the invalidity of the poison pill under Delaware law.
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Unfortunately, Delaware law was not then up to the task. As I have
described the phenomenon elsewhere, the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s
subjected the traditional structure of corporate law to the equivalent of a
stress test. Driven by one of "the most significant corporate restructuring[s]
in history, serious doctrinal cracks appeared, the most important of which
concerned allocating final decision rights in the face of a hostile tender

offer." 3 Corporate law provided two general standards of review of
management conduct: the business judgment rule, applicable to claims that

management violated its duty of care; and the intrinsic fairness test,
applicable to claims that management violated its duty of loyalty. Hostile
takeovers drove in a wedge at their point of tangency, leaving a yawning
doctrinal chasm. On the one hand, evaluating the desirability of a target's
acquisition is the quintessential business judgment. On the other hand,

target management faces an inherent conflict of interest in confronting a
transaction that directly threatens both their positions and their egos.
Deploying defensive tactics thus resembles an interested transaction that
calls for review under the rigorous entire fairness standard. As a matter of
corporate law, existing doctrine left wide open the critical functional
question: who should make the decision concerning the outcome of a hostile
takeover bid? 4 As a matter of public policy, the resolution of this question
would significantly influence who would govern the largest and most
powerful private institutions in our society.
Two contending interest groups advanced quite different answers with
equal vigor. Takeover defense lawyers argued that board decisions with
respect to tender offers should be treated like board decisions concerning any
other acquisition proposal: the business judgment rule should operate to
allocate the primary decision-making role to management.' Academics took
a very different view. From their perspective, tender offers are themselves
an important corporate governance device. Academics therefore urged that
the shareholders should be allocated the final decision-making role. In this
view, the market for corporate control served to displace inefficient
managers both directly through a particular transaction, and indirectly
through the general deterrence resulting from the threat of a takeover.
Efficient operation of the market for corporate control necessitated that

'Ronald . Gilson, The Fine Art ofJudging: William T. Allen, 22 DEL. J. CoRe. L. 914,

914 (1997).
"Fora contemporaneous flamingofthe issue, see Ronald I. Gilson, ASucturalApproach
to Corporations: The CaseAgaInstDefensive Tacticsin Takeovers, 33 STAN.L.REv. 819,845-48
(1981).
"Martin Lipton advanced this position most effectively. Lipton, supranote 10, at 130.
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shareholders
make the ultimate decision concerning the success of a hostile
16
bid.
Interestingly, the pro-management takeover defense lawyers and the
pro-shareholder academics implicitly agreed on an important common
premise: courts should not determine the outcome of the largest business
transactions in history. Figure One illustrates the position of the contending
groups on the identity of the proper takeover decision maker.
Figure One: Who Should Decide the Outcome of a Hostile Bid?
.-.........

.

.......................

.

m if

In Unocal,the Delaware Supreme Court chose the middle ground that
had been championed by no one. The court unveiled an intermediate
standard of review, somewhere between the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty. What was especially notable about what came to be called the
proportionality test - did the hostile offer present a threat and, if so, was the
target's response proportional 7 - was the role of the court itself. In
assessing the balance between threat and response, the court cast itself as an
arbitrator of the substantive merit of target company behavior. As Unocal
was originally framed, the court functions, in effect, as a regulatory agency,
deciding for itself between good defensive tactics - those reasonable in
relation to the threat - and bad defensive tactics, those that go beyond what
the bid requires. Unusually for Delaware law, Unocalcommitted the court,
in appropriate circumstances, to substitute its judgment for that of the board.
And lest anyone doubt that the court had set itself up to regulate defensive
conduct, the decision in Moran v. HouseholdInternational,Inc.,'l coming

6

See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Managementin Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. Ray. 1161 (1981); Gilson, supranote
14, at 845-48.
"The proportionality test determined if the hostile offer presented a threat and, if so,
whether the target's response was proportional. See Ronald J. Gilson & Rainier Kraakman,
Delaware'sIntermediateStandardforDefensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality
Review, 44 Bus. LAw. 247, 252 (1989).
"500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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directly on the heels of Unocal,made matters absolutely clear. Despite the
supreme courtes quite activist stance in approving a board of directors'
adoption of a poison pill without shareholder approval, it reserved to itself
an intermediate level of review of a board's decision not to redeem the pill
after an offer actually was made. The court- and plainly not the board in
the exercise of its business judgment - would decide whether declining to
pull the pill was a proportionate response.
II. THE CHANCERY COURT'S DEVELOPMENT OF UNOCAL:
ALLOCATING DECISION-MAKING ROLES
BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS

At this point, the supreme court largely retired from the field, leaving
the court of chancery to work out the profile of the new regulatory role
implicit in the proportionality test. In deference to Delaware's traditional
respect for the business judgment rule and the limited judicial role the
business judgment role dictates, the chancery court responded by recasting
Unocal in terms of an allocation of decision-making roles not between the
board and the court, but between the board and the shareholders. And it was
at this point in the drama that Reinier Kraakman and I wrote our Business
Lawyer article out of the fear, well-placed as it turned out, that despite the
bold words of Unocal and HouseholdInternational,the Delaware Supreme
Court could not sustain the regulatory function of directly assessing the
merits of target company defensive tactics. 9
Perhaps because it also doubted the supreme court's resolve, the
chancery court in a series of cases highlighted by Anderson, Clayton,2"
Interco,2 1 and Pillsbwy,' developed a thoughtful doctrinal framework that
focused not on judicial assessment of the wisdom of director decisions, but
on allocating decision responsibility between shareholders and directors. In
the face of a non-coercive hostile offer, directors could respond to a belief
that the price offered was too low - "substantive coercion" in today's
inaccurate use of the term - by using a pill to secure the time to negotiate
"Gilson & Kraakman, supranote 17, at 266.
'A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
21
City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
'Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
23
he term was coined in Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 268, to refer to the claim
by target management that target shareholders might accept an offer which, despite reflecting a
substantial premium over market price, nonetheless understated the company's intrinsic value.
While Gilson and Kraakman acknowledged the concept, the article specified a detailed judicial
inquiry into the factual basis for the belief; the simple assertion ofunderpricing was insufficient to
establish substantive coercion:
To support an allegation ofsubstantive coercion, ameaningful proportionality test
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or seek a better offer. In the end, however, after time for negotiating and
investigating alternatives, the directors could not 'just say no" by declining
to pull the pill, and thereby blocking the shareholders from rejecting the
board's strategy and accepting the hostile offer. Chancellor Allen put the
matter most clearly in Interco:
To acknowledge that directors may employ the recent
innovation of "poison pills" to deprive shareholders of the

ability effectively to accept a noncoercive offer, after the board
has had a reasonable opportunity to explore or create
alternatives or attempt to negotiate on the shareholders' behalf,
would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent with widely shared
notions of corporate governance as to threaten to diminish the
legitimacy and authority of our corporate law.'
Chancellor Allen applied the same approach in Time-Warner, an
opinion that warrants careful attention despite its ill treatment by the
Delaware Supreme Court on appeal. Perhaps anticipating that the supreme
court, one way or another, would allow Time to complete its acquisition of
Warner regardless of shareholder preferences, the Chancellor allowed Time
to go forward with the acquisition. Allen stressed, however, that, "because
ofthe timing involved, the board has no need here to rely upon a self-created
power designed to assure a veto on all changes in control." z And to
eliminate any possibility that the point might be misunderstood, Allen

requires acoherentstatementofmanagement's expectations aboutthe futurevalue
of the company. From the perspective of shareholders, substantive coercion is
possible only if a management plausibly expects to better the terms of a hostile
offer-whether by bargaining with the offeror, by securing a competitive bid, or
by managing the company better than the market expects. To make such a claim
requires more than the standard statement that a targets board and its advisers
believe the hostile offer to be "grossly inadequate." In particular, demonstrating
the existence ofa threat ofsubstantive coercion requires a showing ofhow- and
when - management expects a target's shareholders to do better.
Id. at 268. Unfortunately, only the phrase and not the substance captured the attention of the
Delaware Supreme Court; the mere incantation of substantive coercion now seems sufficient to
establish a threat under Unocal without any inquiry into the facts or managemenfs explanation for
the market's under pricing of the company's shares. Much to Professor Kra
's and my relief,
Vice-Chancellor Strine discusses the Delaware Supreme Courts misuse ofthe concept ofsubstantive
coercion in Chesapeake Corp. v.Shore, No. 17,626,2000 Del.Ch. LEXIS 20 (Del. Feb. 7,2000).
24
Interco,551 A.2d at 799-800.
'Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., No. 10,866, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77,
at *88 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), reprintedin 15 DEL. J. CoRP.L. 700, 749 (1990). Recall that
Paramount could not close a tender offer for Time without securing local government approvals of
the transfer of cable television franchises, a timing problem that did not impede Time's offer for
Warner.
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appended a footnote stating that the outcome might well have been different
if Time were relying on a poison pill - in Allen's words, "a control
mechanism and not a devise with independent business purposes."26'
In short, the chancery court opinion in Time-Warner, at least with
respect to the proportionality leg of Unocal, simply parallels Interco. In
Interco,management was allowed to proceed with its sale ofthe Ethan Allen
division even if the sale had the effect of blocking the hostile offer, as it in
fact did. However, the pill ultimately had to be pulled to allow shareholders
to decide whether to accept the hostile offer. In Time-Warner, Time could
proceed with its acquisition of Warner even if it had the effect of blocking
Paramounfs hostile offer; because Time did not rely on a pill, shareholders
were free to decide whether to accept a hostile offer for the combined
companies should one be made. As in Interco, managers pursued their
business plan unchecked by the hostile takeover, and shareholders decided
whether to accept an offer, albeit one that ultimately was withdrawn as in
Interco or was never made as in Time-Warner.
And that brings us to the supreme court's development of Unocal,
which I will argue has proven dramatically less successful than the approach
taken by the chancery court. So that it will be clear where I am going with
this, I have two points to make. First, we lack a coherent explanation ofwhy
the supreme court rejected the chancery court's carefully crafted allocation
of decision-making authority between shareholders and management. In
particular, the supreme court opinion in Time-Warnerseems simply to have
misunderstood the body of law the chancery court had created. Second, the
supreme courfs effort to articulate the Unocal standard, most explicitly in
Unitrin,"'collapses into an unexplained functional preference that changes
of control should occur through elections rather than courts.
Il. THE RmJCTION OF THE CHANCERY COURT'S APPROACH

In the debate between the chancery court and supreme court in TimeWarner,the supreme court won only by fiat The supreme court's response
to the chancery courts Unocaljurisprudence came in a cryptic one-sentence
reference. Responding to Paramounfs position that an all-cash, non-coercive
offer was not a threat under Unocal,the supreme court stated:
"To the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently
[substituted its judgment for what is a 'better deal' for that of
a corporation's board of directors] in certain of its opinions, we

2Id. at *88 n.22, reprintedin 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 749 n.22.
'Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
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hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper
I
Unocal analysis. See, e.g., Interco and its progeny ....
But Interco had nothing to do with substituting the court's judgment
for that of the board. To the extent that Interco is about substitution at all,
it involved substituting the shareholders' - not the courtes -judgment for
that of the directors'. Interco makes this point explicitly. Allowing
directors, the court stated, "to deprive shareholders of the ability effectively
...to accept a noncoercive offer.., would be so inconsistent with widely
shared notions of corporate governance as to... diminish the legitimacy...
of our corporate law."" The decision-making conflict here is between the
board and the shareholders; the courts judgment about "what is a 'better
deal' is beside the point, and so, it follows, was the concern voiced by the
supreme court in Time-Warner.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN UNITRIN: THE PREFERENCE
FOR ELECTIONS OVER MARKETS

Time-Warner thus left us with the clear understanding that the
supreme court had rejected whatever it conceived the chancery court to have
crafted, but without giving us any sense of what it had in mind. That began
to take form in Unitrin,decided some five years after Time-Warner. Under
Unitrin's elaboration of the proportionality test, a defensive tactic survives
the intermediate standard of review if it is neither coercive nor preclusive
and falls within a range of reasonableness. For present purposes, the critical
question is whether the defensive tactic is preclusive. But the preliminary
question is preclusive ofwhat? Refusing to redeem a poison pill will always
preclude a tender offer. It will not, however, necessarily preclude a proxy
fight to replace the targets directors with nominees who can be expected to
conclude, after careful and informed deliberation, that the offer is in the
shareholders' best interests and thereafter redeem the pill. Does the presence
of a poison pill allow a target company to force a bidder to have the success
of its offer determined by an election rather than a tender offer?
Without confronting the issue directly, the Delaware Supreme Court
appears to have simply assumed that the availability of a proxy fight renders
a poison pill non-preclusive, thereby shifting the focus to the circumstances
under which the proxy fight would be conducted. The court acknowledged
that "[w]ithout the approval of a target's board, the danger of activating a
poison pill renders it irrational for bidders to pursue stock acquisitions above

'Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990).
1nterco, 551 A.2d at 799-800.

29
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the triggering level."3 Thus, a poison pill is preclusive of a tender offer.
But under Unitrin,refusal to redeem the pill is not preclusive under Unocal
unless a proxy fight is also precluded. On remand, the supreme court in
Unitrin directed the chancery court to "determine whether Unitrin's
Repurchase Program would only inhibit American General's ability to wage
a proxy fight and institute a merger or whether it was, in fact, preclusive
because American General's success would either be mathematically
impossible or realistically unattainable."'"
Thus, Unitrinat least identifies the circumstance when Unocalallows
a target to block a tender offer by declining to "pull the pill" - if a proxy
fight is not "mathematically impossible" or "realistically unattainable."
Because the poison pill has become ubiquitous - every public company
either has adopted a pill or can adopt one if a hostile offer is made - the
Delaware Supreme Courts analysis reduces functionally to a preference that
control contests be resolved through an election, rather than a market: a
target can block a tender offer so long as a stymied bidder can press its case
through a proxy fight? 2
My purpose here is not to criticize the courts doctrinal analysis,
although that task commends itself. For example, one certainly would have
thought that prior doctrine dictated a somewhat more rigorous limit on
defensive action in response to a proxy fight than that the action not render
the proxy fight mathematically or realistically unattainable. Rather, I will
focus only on the wisdom of the court's apparent conclusion however
opaquely reached: that proxy contests are preferable to tender offers as a
means of resolving a control contest.

-Unitrin,
651 A.2d at 1381.
31
kd at 1388-89.
32 To be sure, the court in Household Internationaljustified the pill in part because
shareholders retained access to the proxy mechanism, the court nonetheless reserved a review
functionunder Unocalwhenthe target company refised aredemption request by abidder. Itis also
important to note that the Delaware Chancery Court seems committed to resisting the implications
of Unitrin. In Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, No. 17,626, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7,
2000), Vice-Chancellor Strine's surgical dissection of Unitrin makes obvious that chancery will not
easily follow the supreme court down the Unitrin path. While the vice-chancellor acknowledges
"thatthere is some tension between some of my analysis and the reasoning of Unitrin".he had the
advantage of facts extremely favorable to the plaintiff, the extent of which is illustrated by the
holding that target company directors had violated notjust the intermediate standard by adopting

defensive tactics, buttheirduty ofcare as well. Hopefully, suchreasoned resistance by the chancery
court will help the supreme court to reassess the process set in motion by Time-Warner and
accelerated by Unitrin.
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V. THE PROBLEMS WITH A PREFERENCE FOR ELECTIONS

The Delaware Supreme Coures preference for elections presents three
serious problems. The first poses a simple process concern: the need for
transparency in setting the rules by which important business transactions
must be considered. The other two are substantive. First, markets are more
efficient than elections at resolving control contests; the court's preference
makes the process less effective. Second, the court's rule has had the
predictable effect of shifting defensive energy into proxy contests; the
Unitrinelection preference thus serves to degrade the electoral process itself.
A. The Obligationto Providean Explanation
The process problem is that the court in Unitrin provides neither
explanation nor justification for its preference for elections. A court's
obligation to provide reasons for its action is more than a matter of
professional craft; explaining the chosen outcome at least imposes the
discipline of logic on the range of alternatives available to a court. As
important, an explanation provides in equal measure not only ajustification
for the result in a particular case, but also guidance for the future. In
Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme Court confronted an issue that it had
managed to avoid for ten years: can a target company 'just say no" by
declining to pull the pill? A common law court - and most takeover law
is common law and not statutory - has a professional obligation to clearly
articulate the grounds for its decision. Uncertainty may preserve a court's
flexibility, as some commentators have suggested in defense of the studied
ambiguity of important Delaware Supreme Court opinions,33 but it comes at
the expense of allowing parties to order their affairs. As a result, the court
gets it precisely backwards: the point is to make things easier for actors in
the economy to go about their business, not to make it easier for courts.
B. MarketsAre More Efficient than Elections
at Mediatingthe Transferof Control
The first substantive problem concerns the direct costs of preferring
elections to markets: the preference is not justified. While this is not the

3
See Marcel Kahan, Paramountor Paradox: The DelawareSupreme Court's Takeover
Jurisprudence, 19 J. CoRP. L. 583, 589 (1994); Charles Yablon, Poison Pills and Legal
Uncertainty,1989 DuKE L.J. 54 (1989).
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time to work out the argument more formally, 4 I think it is straightforward
to show that elections at best can be the equivalent of markets in determining

when it is efficient for a control change to proceed, but that under more

realistic circumstances, elections will be significantly worse 5
The equivalency case involves making heroically simplifying
assumptions of the sort common in most economic models. Assume that a
bidder launches a tender offer that target management believes is
substantively coercive. Further assume that because target management
declines to pull the pill, shareholders are barred from accepting the tender
offer unless the board of directors is replaced. In this hypothetical, however,
we have an innovative election procedure. The shareholders cast their

ballots for directors by checking a box on the letter of transmittal when they
conditionally tender their shares. If the ballots are sufficient to replace the
directors, then the pill is automatically pulled and the bidder can take down
the shares.3 6 Finally, assume that all shareholders are perfectly informed
about both the merits of the competing positions and the detail of the target
directors' good faith beliefthat the market undervalues the companys stock.

Under these quite restrictive assumptions - perfect information and
an election structure identical to the tender offer - the election is
tautologically equivalent to a non-coercive tender offer.
The equivalence disappears, however, once the simplifying
assumptions are released and some reality intrudes on the analysis." Most
important, a proxy contest invites manipulation on the part of the target
company to influence the outcome of the election. The risk remains that,
under the second Apple Bancorp decision, 3 cooperation among parties in
connection with a proxy contest will serve itself to trigger a pill. Further,

'Alan Schwartz and I attempt to show formally the comparative inefficiency of elections
in Ronald . Gilson & Alan Schwartz Sales andElectionsas Methods of TransferringCorporate
Control (Working Paper 2000).
35
For this purpose I will not rely on public choice problems with voting as applied to
corporate law. See Jeffrey Gordon, ShareholderInitiative: A SocialChoice andGame Theoretic
Approach to CorporateLaw, 60 U. CiN. L. REV. 347 (1991).
'6 This process is only one step offofreality. While the supreme court in MentorGraphics
made clear that the newly elected directors must exercise their independent business judgment in
evaluating the bidder's offer, see QuicidurnDesign Sys., Inc.v. Mentor GraphicsCorp., 721 A.2d
1281,1282(Del. 1999), itis predictable that acareful record will be craftedto support theirdecision
to let the offer go forward. Thus, the simplified procedure in the text assumes away only the
choreography.
3
'Ihese assumptions might not be so unrealistic ifthe Delaware Supreme Court had not in
Stroud v. Grace,606 A.2d 75,82-83 (DeL 1992) collapsed Blarius' requirement of a compelling
justification for management interference with the electoral process into Unocalfor purposes of a
proxy contest associated with a tender offer.
3
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,412 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 1990).
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target companies may succeed in manipulating the election by recourse to
techniques for strategically delaying the timing of the shareholders' meeting
through notice provisions, director qualification requirements, and limits on
the calling and timing of special meetings. Finally, there remains the issue
of staggered boards. For those companies who have won the defensive
lottery by having a staggered board in place before institutional investors
decided that, because ofthe interaction of staggered boards with poison pills,
they would not vote for them, or for those companies who went public with
a staggered board already in place, the election route requires a minimum of
two years to change control of the board.39 While one may question whether
independent directors will continue the defense if the would-be bidder
handily wins the frst proxy fight,' even a small possibility of a two-year
delay can be of enormous significance in today's quickly moving product
markets.
Thus, once we get real, elections clearly appear a poor second to
markets in assessing the benefits of a contested control change. Of course,
this should come as no surprise; the SEC directly confronted the issue of the
comparative efficiency of elections and markets at mediating control changes
in crafting Rule 19c-4. Then, it will be recalled, the issue was whether an
election could be used to shift control of a company by means of a charter
amendment creating two classes of voting common stock. Consistent with
the case for requiring those seeking control to buy it rather than campaign
for it,4 ' the SEC adopted a rule that favored markets over elections. As
adopted in July, 1988, Rule 19c-4 prohibited changing the voting rights of
existing common stock by ballot, but allowed new issuances of common
stock with lesser voting rights than the outstanding class of common stock.42
9
See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO ChartersMaximize Firm Value?
AntitakeoverProtectioninllPOs(Law and Economics Working Paper No. 99-015, 2000) (stating
that 43.5% of companies undertaking an IPO between 1993 and 1998 had staggered boards). This
paper is accessible through the Legal Scholarship Network at http://papers.ssm.ccom/paper.taf?
ABSTRACTID=187348. Robert Daines' recent working paper reports that adding a staggered
boardto apoisonpill reduces flrmvalueby 1.50 . RobertDainesDoClassifiedBoards.AffectFirm
Value? TakeoverDefenses After the PoisonPill(Working Paper, March 2001).
'See Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural
Limitationson the EnablingConcept,34 STAN. L. REV. 775,794 (1982) (Once the target company
has lost the first proxy fight,"an independent director has no reason to fight a fall-back action in the
face of both inevitable defeat and the ideology of majority rule.").
4
The issue was posed in this fashion in Ronald . Gilson, EvaluatingDualClass Common
Stock: The Relevance ofSubstitutes, 73 VA.L. REv. 807,810 (1987).
4
Me 19c-4 was short-lived. See Business Roundtablev. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir.
1990). The SEC was found to have exceeded its statutory authority to regulate stock exchanges by
adopting a rule that was largely concerned with corporate governance. Ultimately, the New York
StockExchange, American StockExchange, and NASDAQ voluntarily adopted a rule thatparallels
Rule 19c-4, although not before those companies who most wanted to shift control through an
election had already accomplished it and who were grandfathered under the voluntary rule. See
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Despite the comparative efficiency of markets compared to elections,
the court might have relied on the statute to justify its preference for
elections. The problem, however, is that the statutory language itself
provides no clear guidance. As the debate over the poison pill in Household
International clearly demonstrates, statutory language often does not
command a particular result, but is consistent with either of the conflicting
results urged by both parties. The statute, like a golem, requires an
animating principle to come alive. In HouseholdInternational,the principle
was the Delaware Supreme Court's commitment to review the actual
operation of the pill under Unocal when a takeover arose. But Unitrin's
effective abandonment of Unocals regulatory function brings us back to the
need for an animatingjustification: why should the court prefer elections to
markets? And on this issue, Unitrin simply leaves us hanging.
C. The Supreme Court'sElection Preference
Serves to Degradethe Election Process
The second substantive problem with preferring elections to markets
in mediating changes in control is indirect the impact ofthe supreme court's
preference for elections on the integrity of the electoral process itself. The
predictable result of Unitrinhas been a quickly escalating level of boardimplemented barriers to contested elections.43 And, to be frank, judicial
efforts to constrain this process have not been up to the task.
The portion of the chancery courts opinion in Mentor Graphicsthat
concerned the defensively adopted bylaw illustrates the problem.' The
bylaw, adopted by target directors to buy time in the face of a proxy contest
that they believed the company could not win, authorized the directors to
delay the holding of a shareholder called meeting for 90 to 100 days after it
determined the validity of the initial request. The Vice-Chancellor
concluded that the "the 90 to 100 day interval chosen by the target board,
although it may arguably approach the outer limit of reasonableness, struck
a proper balance in this specific case."45 It is not unfair to the ViceChancellor to note that there is no real discussion of why ninety days is
necessary. And it is certainly to the Vice-Chancellor's credit that he was
quite clearly aware of the risk that approving a 90 to 100 day delay without
an animating principle that might serve to cabin the opinion's predictable
571 (5th ed. 2000).
'It is something ofa puzzle that the takeover defense bar lauds elections but then devises
even more aggressive techniques - like dead hand and slow hand pills - whose only purpose is
to undermine them.
Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998).
'Mentor
4
3See id. at 41-42.
JESsE CHOPER ETAL., CASES AND MATERIALus ON CORPoRATIONs
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expansive drift, would encourage ever more extreme measures. After all, the
worst that could happen to an overly aggressive target management is that
the bylaw would be struck down.
Recognizing the incentive in favor of aggressive defensive behavior,
the Vice-Chancellor explicitly warned that "attorneys who represent
corporate boards would best serve their clients well by counseling caution
and restraint in this area, rather than seeking continually to push the timedelay envelope outwards to test its fiduciary duty limits."' But while the
impulse to lecture counsel on their duties is both laudable and continues the
chancery courfs useful technique of instructing counsel through dicta,47 the
simple fact is that the Delaware courts' approach in this area operates to
encourage attorneys to push the envelope precisely because there is no
principle guiding the outcome. What factors would counsel against a delay
of ninety days, said by the court to be potentially unreasonable "in other
circumstances"? If, as the court suggests, "it is impossible to draw a line that
categorically separates mandatory delay periods which have a basis in
reason, from those that so manifestly burden or impede the election process
that they can be characterized as intended to entrench the incumbent board,"
then how can the ambiguity do other than encourage clients "continually to
push the time-delay envelope outwards," precisely the behavior we have
observed with the poison pill. Certainly, respected counsel's assistance in
the adoption of slow-hand and dead-hand pills gives one little reason to
anticipate professional self-control.
Nor should the onus be placed entirely on the chancery court. The
standard on remand in Unitrin - that a tactic not render a proxy fight
"mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable" - itself invites
extreme measures since the formulation implies that the process can be
drastically skewed in managemenfs favor so long as it is not impossible for
a bidder to win the proxy fight.
In the end, the absence of a guiding principle restricting director
manipulation of election contests is the greatest irony of all. While the
Delaware courts plainly recognize that elections are all that legitimate
directors' power over assets that belong to others, the shifting of control
contests into the electoral process has served to degrade the electoral process
itself. It is difficult to imagine an electoral process that can both confer
legitimacy on the victor and still leave the incumbent very substantial
discretion to manipulate the process. Debate over the timing of last year's
Peruvian presidential election starkly illustrates the problem.
4

6d.

'See Gilson, supra note 13, at 917-18; Edward B. Rock, Saints andSinners: How Does
Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1009, 1016-17 (1997).
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VI. Is THERE A WAY OUT? THE SHAREHOLDER
ADOPTED BYLAW DEBATE

However trenchant, criticism is made constructive only by providing
a solution to the problem. How can the Delaware Supreme Court ameliorate
the electoral bias created in Unitrin" without simply reversing fifteen years
of common law development?" 9 I think such an avenue exists and, indeed,
in the context ofan issue that the Delaware courts will certainly confront: the
validity of shareholder-adopted bylaws to redeem poison pills.
Taken to its conclusion, this analysis calls into question not merely
Time-Warner, in which the supreme court lifted the chancery court's more
erosion-resistant allocation of decision authority between directors and
shareholders, but also Household International, which provided the
mechanism by which the erosion subsequently occurred. Fifteen years
experience with Unocalteaches thatshareholders ought to decide whether
to accept an offer made to them, subject to the board's efforts to secure for
them a better alternative. As the chancery court explained in Interco, the
legitimacy of our corporate law and, we now have seen, the legitimacy ofthe
electoral process as well, depends on the shareholders' ultimate decisionmaking role. With the benefit of hindsight, the pill in Household
Internationalshould have been struck down for the very reason that it was
expedient to management: the absence of shareholder approval.
But what do we do now? I start with the widely shared view that the
genius of Delaware corporate law and of American corporate law generally
is that it is for the most part enabling - it gives the parties the freedom to
choose their governance structure rather than imposing an outcome upon

"Vice-Chancellor Strine recently commented with refreshing candor that
Delaware's doctrinal approach [to defensivetactics] is premised on the assumption
that the world can be viewed clearly by simultaneously wearing three pairs of eye
glasses with different prescriptions (Unocal, business judgment, and entire
fairness). It is not apparent that this approach works any better in the law than it
does in the field of optics.
In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders' Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 477 n.46 (Del. Ch. 2000).
49
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994),
suggests that the current Delaware Supreme Court is oversensitive to admitting it had made a
mistake. In QVC the supreme court rejected the formulation of the Revlon trigger it announced in
21ime-Warnerin favor ofthe "change in control" test originally proffered by the chancery court in
ime-Warner(which the supreme court had rejected in that case in order to base its decision on
different grounds). See id at 46-47. When confronted by Paramount counsel's claim in QVC that
Paramounthad complied with the standard the supreme court announced in Time-Warner,the court
responded by stating that "[t]he Paramount defendants have misread the holding of ime-Warner.
...The Paramount defendants' argument totally ignores the phrase 'without excluding other
possibilities."' Sek at 47. Put differently, counsel should have known that the court had its fingers
crossed in Time-Warner. It would have been more straightforward for the court simply to
acknowledge that it had changed its mind and was adopting the chancery court's formulation.
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them. The Delaware courts' sympathetic treatment of the pill, understandably caught up in the frenzy of the 1980s, lost sight of that fact. The
attraction of the pill to target management is that it can be imposed without
shareholder approval, and shareholders cannot remove it without incurring
the cost, in resources and opportunity, of replacing a board of directors that
might in all other respects be doing an excellent job. That is hardly an
enabling approach; as Chancellor Allen pointed out in Blasius, directors are
not Platonic guardians. 5 Rather, it reflects the sense of the times, incorrect
to be sure but an understandable accommodation in a moment of perceived
crisis, that shareholders could not be trusted to vote for sensible defensive
measures.
We are past that point now. Institutional investors quite routinely
approve sensibly drafted pills, and even some not-so-sensibly drafted pills
that are proposed by trusted, well performing management. In this calmer
time, it would be appropriate to return to an enabling approach that allowed
shareholders to choose their governance regime, including whether to have
a poison pill. But how to accomplish this without entirely replanting a path
now worn clear by fifteen years' experience?
Shareholder adopted bylaws are now working their way up the
judicial process toward a determination of their fit under Delaware law. As
I understand it, the standard response among many thoughtful Delaware
lawyers, especially after Mentor Graphics,is that such bylaws violate section
141 (a)'s grant of managerial authority to the board of directors." However,
section 141(a)'s grant of authority is qualified by the phrase "except as
otherwise permitted in this chapter or in the certificate of incorporation."52
Section 109(b) - obviously in "this chapter" - authorizes shareholders to
adopt bylaws containing "any provision, not inconsistent with law or with
the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation,
the conduct of its affairs, and the rights and powers of its stockholders,
directors, officers, or employees."53
As my colleague Jeffrey Gordon has perceptively noted, the broad
grant of management authority to the directors in section 141(a), referring

'See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Professr -armensh surveys professional opinion on the validity of shareholder-adopted
bylaws to repeal a poison pill. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and StockholderAdoptedBy-Laws: TalingBackthe Street?,73 TULANEL. REv. 409,429(1998). For the opinions
of two respected Delaware law firms to the effect that such bylaws violate Delaware law, see
NorthwestAirlines Corp., 2001 WL 114960 (S.E.C.) (2001) (Richards Layton & Finger); Novell,
Inc., 2000 WL 223715 (S.E.C.) (2000) (Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell).
5DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1996).

Id. § 109(b).

3
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to the "business and affairs of the corporation," juxtaposed with the equally
broad grant of authority for shareholder-adopted bylaws in section 109(b),
referring to "the business of the corporation [and] the conduct of its
affairs, '0s5 should call to mind the Delaware doctrine of "equal dignity" or
"independent legal significance."5 This doctrine, which lets corporate
participants choose among different statutory alternatives for dealing with
precisely the same functional activity, is the very embodiment of Delaware's
enabling approach. The board manages pursuant to section 141(a); the
shareholders adopt bylaws pursuant to section 109(b). Under the equal
dignity doctrine, the fact that the two sections cover the same ground results
not in a conflict, but in alternative approaches to the same problem. 7
Allowing shareholders to redeem poison pills or replace them with
less expansive versions by means of a bylaw allows the Delaware Supreme
Court to back off with grace from the extreme position to which they were
driven by the turmoil of the 1980s and the failure of any other institution,
most notably the United States Congress, to give the governance of
takeovers more than superficial attention. In particular, shareholder-adopted
bylaws largely (but not entirely) returns to shareholders the decision-making
role with respect to tender offers that Ho useholdInternationaltransferred to
the board of directors, and allows shareholders to reverse Time-Warner by
reinstating only an Interco-style constrained pill.

-Id.
§ 141(a).
"II § 109(b).
6Jeffrey Gordon, "JustSay Never?" Poison Pills,DeadhandPills,and ShareholderAdoptedBylaws: An Essayfor Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOzoL. REV. 511,546-47 (1997). The most

familiar application ofthe equal dignity doctrine in Delaware has been its deployment to defeat the
defacto merger doctrine. The statutory conflict between functionally equivalent acquisition
techniques only one of which accords target shareholders appraisal rights, is ignored by according
each technique independent legal significance; i.e., allowing the parties to the transaction to choose
whether to accord appraisal rights. See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. Ch. 1933);
GILsoN &BLACK, supranote 5,at 674-87. However, the doctrine has also been applied in the
context of conflicts between the board and shareholders over the power to shape the corporation's
governance system. In ChesapeakeCorp.v. Shore No. 17,626,2000 Del. Ch.LEXIS 20 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 7, 2000), the court held that section 109's grant of bylaw amendment power to shareholders
allowedthe shareholdersto eliminate aclassifiedboard structure despitesection 141(k)'sprohibition
ofthe removal of a director without cause when the board is classified unless the certificate of
incorporation"otherwiseprovides." InFranldinov.GleasonNo. 17,399 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19,1999),
a bylaw required an 80% vote to alter the size of the board. The bylaw, however, did not require
an 80% vote to amend the bylaw requiring an 80%vote. The court allowed a majority vote to
eliminate the 80% requirement and then increase the size of the board.
'As the Delaware Supreme Court put it in Orzek v.Englehart,195 A.2d 375, 378 (Del.
1963): "he general theory oftheDelaware General Corporation Lawis that action taken under one
section of that law is not legally dependent, and its validity is not dependent upon, nor to be tested
by the requirements of other unrelated sections under which the same result might be obtained by
different means."
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The shareholder bylaw route still leaves the balance between
shareholders and management tipped toward management; absent
HouseholdInternational,it would be better to require the directors to seek
shareholder approval to impose a pill in the first instance rather than
requiring the shareholders to seek repeal because of our rules for who bears
the cost of proxy initiatives."9 Nonetheless, it is a workable way out of an

outcome that, because it encourages managerial manipulation of the electoral
process, genuinely degrades the legitimacy of Delaware corporate law.
To be sure, one can undertake a more technical interpretive analysis
concerning how the conflicting language of sections 109(b) and 141(a)
might be rationalized. While it can be argued that the language of section
109(b) was hardly intended for this function, HouseholdInternationalitself
provides the response. Responding to the same objection with respect to its
broad reading of section 157, the supreme court quoted Unocal: "[O]ur
corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in response to, indeed
in anticipation of,evolving concepts and needs. Merely because the General
Corporation law is silent, as to a specific matter does not mean that it is
prohibited." 9 Stretching section 157 correspondingly stretches section

109(b).
Professor Coffee takes the problem more seriously, providing a
careful and quite plausible exegesis of alternative approaches to limit the
breadth of shareholder initiative under section 109(b), and thereby minimize
the conflict with director authority under section 14 l(a), while still allowing
shareholders to repeal poison pills.' In contrast, Professor Hamermesh
concludes after a lengthy analysis that traditional and non-traditional tools
of statutory interpretation, the public choice problems associated with
shareholder voting, and especially the difficulty of identifying of defining a
"poison pill," counsel in favor of stopping section 109(b) short of poison pill
repeal.61
My goal here is not to resolve the scope of section 109(b) as a matter
of technical interpretation beyond expecting the Delaware Supreme Court

GusoN & BLAcK, supranote 5, at 1337 n.28 (Speaking with respect to the same issue in

connection with a corporation opting out of a state antitakeover statute, "[i]f the statutes were
structured this way, management would still be able to use corporate funds to propose the
amendment and solicit votes in its favor, but shareholders would at least have the opportunity to

reject it").
59

Unocal,493 A.2d at 957.

'John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can InstitutionsChange the Outcome of
CorporateControl Contests?,51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605, 617-18 (1997).
"lHamennesh,supra note 51.

2001]

UNOCAL FIFTEEN YEARS LATER

to hew to its equal dignity canon,' in no small measure because I am enough
of a realist to be skeptical both of the power of technical arguments to drive
as opposed to rationalize outcomes,63 especially in Delaware, and of a
coherent explanation that distinguishes under Delaware law when the
conflict between statutory provisions must be respected - the equal dignity

move - and when the conflict is explained away through interpretation.
Nonetheless, two rather practical points are worth making. First, defining
a poison pill presents at worst no greater difficulty than defining a defensive
action under Unocal, a task that has been largely uncontroversial. To
paraphrase a response to a different interpretative problem, the Delaware
courts have known defensive tactics when they have seen them, and will
know a poison pill when they see one." Second, the interpretive problem is
of no grander scale than the Delaware Supreme Courtes assessment in

6
"The most direct argument is that the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Mentor
Graphicsinvalidates any incursion on the board of directors' authority to manage the corporation.
See Dennis J. Block & Simon C. Roosevelt, FurtherImplicationsof the Mentor Graphicsand
FlemingDecisionsfor ShareholderBylaws, 7 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 18 (issue 2,
MarJApr. 1999). Read more narrowly, and consistent with an equal dignity approach, Mentor
Graphicsholds only that section 141 prevents a board of directors from acting to limit the power
of future boards of directors to manage the corporation. It does not extend to limitations imposed
by the shareholders under express statutory authority. The chancery court's comment in General
DataCommIndus., v. State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd., No. 16,923,1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 6 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 1, 1999), suggests this narrower interpretation. Considering the validity of a shareholder
adopted bylaw prohibiting the board from repricing outstanding stock options without shareholder
approval, the court framed the issue nicely:
It may be that [the company] is correct in stating that the Repricing Bylaw is
obviously invalid under the teachings of [Quicktwn]. But the question ofwhether
a shareholder-approved bylaw that can potentially be repealed at any time by the
[company's] board ofdirectors exercising its business judgment, is clearly invalid
under the tdaching of a case involving a board-approved contractual rights plan
precluding, by contract, anewboard majority from redeeming the rights under the
plan until six months after election seems to me to be a question worthy of careful
consideration.
General DataComm Indus., Inc. v. State ofWisconsin Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 (Del. Ch. 2000).
Both Professor Coffee, supranote 60, and Professor Hamermesh, supra note 50, discuss possible
resolutions to the problem ofrecursive bylaw adoptions by shareholders and director action, first
repealing and thenreinstatingpoison pills. Forpresentpurposes, itis sufficient to note thateven this
circularity is better than the present situation. At least when shareholders are allowed to act, the
board must overtly overrule the shareholders. As Professor Coffee has noted, this is costly to
directors, presumably more so than taking no action at all in response to precatory resolutions, as
is the case now. Coffee, supranote 60, at 617-18. Even in a system of Burkean representation,
there are repercussions when a representative's judgment differs from those of her constituents.
LKaud
ewellyn makes the point emphatically in his classic illustration that for every canon
of statutory interpretation there is an equal and opposite canon. KARL N. LLEwELLYN, THE
COMMON LAw TRADrIoN: DECIDING APPEALS app. at 521-35 (1960).
'Mhe line drawing problem may involve no more than identifying whether the power to
block a tender offer has been given to the board or to a third party. If the former, the device is a
poison pill; if the later, it may raise Revlon problems but may not be a pill.
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HouseholdInternationalof whether the broad language of Section 157
encompassed poison pills. The outcome requires a theory of the mechanisms
that govern the shifting of corporate control, an animating structural
principle for the bones ofthe statute.ss Unocalwas to provide the theory that
HouseholdInternationallacked, but the lesson of UnocaPsfirst fifteen years
is that the Delaware Supreme Court's march toward an unarticulated and
unjustified preference for elections over markets, however understandable
in its original motivation, has proven to be a failure. The chancery court had
the animating principle right in the first place: the ultimate decision makers
concerning a tender offer should be the shareholders. However realistic the
threat of a tidal wave of junk bond financed, two-tier, bust-up takeovers,
assisted by unthoughtful shareholders, may have appeared to the Delaware
courts in 1985, we know now that it was a chimera. Between bidder and
target now stand large sophisticated shareholders with carefully considered
views of corporate goveriance. Shareholder initiated bylaws provide an
imperfect, but realistic, way to turn back the clock.
VII. IN THE END, A SILVER LINING
So far, I have been quite negative in my assessment of the fifteen-year
Unocalexperiment. However, no cloud is without a silver lining, and in this
case the silver lining is substantial even if accidental.
Given the decision to take on the task of distinguishing between good
and bad defensive tactics, the manner in which the Delaware courts have
carried out that charge is interesting. A fair reading of the supreme courtes
intermediate standard decisions, buttressed by the chancery courts and
especially Chancellor Allen's repeated dicta about the critical role of
independent directors in management buyouts, is that independent directors
are expected to be the controlling parties in a target company's conduct of its
defense. Only when the directors appear to have abdicated their role to
management - think of Van Gorom,s Macmillan,67 and QVC - will the
court intervene.6"

'See Gilson, supranote 14, at 833. It is odd that Professor Hamermesh invokes public
choice problems associated with voting in order to limit the breadth ofshareholder approved bylaws.
The result of his argument is to petrify the Delaware Supreme Court's shift of control contests from
markets to elections which, given his concerns about voting, he must recognize as an inefficient
transfer. So long as a court can recognize a poison pill, so as to cut off the slippery slope that
concerns him, Professor Hamermesh should switch sides on this issue.
"Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
7
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
"Kahan, supra note 33; Rock, supra note 47.
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As I have made clear to this point, I think this is the wrong approach;
evaluating target board conduct misses the question of who should be
making the decision in the first place. But, it seems to me, there has been at
least one beneficial, if unintended, consequence of this focus on director
performance. The role the Delaware Supreme Court has assigned
independent directors in connection with takeovers is quite different than the
role directors assigned to themselves prior to the turbulent 1980s.' At least
in the takeover arena, independent directors, the Delaware courts have stated
pointedly, are not merely advisers to management, who have no stake in
whether their advice is followed. In the takeover arena, independent
directors must be the real decision-makers and courts will expect them to
play a central role in conducting the targets response to a hostile or
competing offer.
That change in assigned role is quite significant, especially because
I believe it cannot be and has not been tightly cabined to the takeover arena.
Once directors internalize the norm that they are the central decision-makers
with respect to the most critical issue in the target company's existence, it is
hard to imagine that the generals will return to the barracks in less pressing
circumstances. Thus, I am convinced that the high profile board firings of
CEOs in a series of large corporations such as Good Year, Allied Signal,
Tenneco, General Motors, American Express, and Westinghouse, reflected
the expansion into other areas of the new role for independent directors that
the Delaware Supreme Court put forward in its takeover jurisprudence. 0
This is no small improvement, and I suppose one might argue that the
systemic benefits of a newly invigorated board of directors may outweigh the
costs of a dysfunctional takeover regime; given that the proper corporate
governance response to problems depends on the nature of the problem, the
tradeoff hinges on what conditions the company is actually facing!' As my
analysis of the shareholder bylaw phenomenon suggests, however, we are
not doomed to suffer the tradeoff. Directors are now energized. We need
no longer continue paying the price of takeover rules that, however well
meaning and driven by circumstances, we can now recognize are far less
than optimal.

"See, e.g., MYLEs MACE, DmECToRs: MYTH AND REALY (1971).
1rhis phenomenon has accelerated. Recentlythe WallStreetJournalreportedthatduring
1999 and the first 10 months of 2000, the chief executive officers of 61 of the 200 largest U.S.
corpbrations were replaced by their boards. Joann S. Lublin & Matt Murray, CEOs DepartFaster
than Even
as Boards,Investors Lose Patience,WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2000, at B1, col. 2.
7t
See Randall Mo eket al.,AlternativeMechanismsforCorporateControl,79 AM. ECON.
REv. 842, 848 (1989) (noting that board action responds to poor performance compared to
competitors, but third party intervention is necessary to respond to industry wide problems.).

